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Professor Ito’s paper is a very thorough and balanced review and assessment of the 
development of Bank of Japan (BOJ) policy during the period of deflation from 1998, when the 
BOJ obtained legal independence, to the present. This period coincided with the terms of BOJ 
governors Hayami and Fukui and a number of important policy innovations. The experience of 
this period certainly provides important lessons for the conduct of monetary policy. 
The paper divides into three main parts: 
1.  A description of the major developments of Japanese monetary policy through 2003 
including the adoption and ending of the zero interest rate policy (ZIRP), and the 
implementation of quantitative easing (QE); 
2.  A review of the debate in the monetary policy meeting (MPM) on inflation targeting; 
3.  A description of monetary policy in 2003-06, focusing on the evolution of the QE 
policy, the refinement of the BOJ’s criteria for exiting from QE, the debate about the 
process for ending QE, and the actual exit in March 2006. 
Professor Ito’s paper raises, either implicitly or explicitly, a number of very significant issues, 
and I would like to focus on these issues in my comments. 
I.  Determinants of monetary policy responses 
The first issue is the choice of policy responses by the Bank of Japan in the case of a liquidity 
trap, or what Prof Ito prefers to call a deflationary trap, when short-term interest rates have 
already been lowered to zero. By definition then, these are unconventional policy measures. 
The table below shows the menu of alternatives suggested in Prof Ito’s paper, plus a couple 
of additional suggestions from the widely cited speech by the current Fed chairman Ben 
Bernanke (2002) on this subject. 
Table 1 
Unconventional monetary policy measures 
 BOJ  Ito   
1.  Commitment to keep short-term interest rates low  x  x 
2.  Explicit ceilings on Iong-term rates     
3.  Monetise domestic government debt  x  x 






5.  Coordinated fiscal and monetary policy     
6  Foreign exchange intervention     x 








Sources: Bernanke (2002); Ito (2005); Svensson (2000). 
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The first four options are fairly straightforward extensions of conventional monetary policy, 
including various ways to influence the level of interest rates further out the curve and to 
expand the size of the central bank’s balance sheet. Their chief virtue is that they can be 
carried out in a straightforward manner using the same kinds of operations that central banks 
use anyway, and they do not require cooperation from other parts of the government. Their 
main disadvantage is that their impact is very likely to be limited in a situation of deflation, 
where interest rates all along the curve generally are already very low, precisely because the 
demand for funds is weak. In these conditions, the impact on portfolio behaviour or 
aggregate demand of a further decline of interest rates is likely to be very small. Therefore, I 
have classified these as “weak” policy options. 
I have classified the options 5-7 as “strong”, because they all have a much clearer 
transmission mechanism for boosting aggregate demand. Coordinated fiscal and monetary 
policy uses monetary policy to monetise government debt issuance resulting either from 
higher expenditures or tax cuts. Foreign exchange intervention, as advocated perhaps most 
strongly by Lars Svensson, increases export demand by lowering the exchange rate and 
raises the price level via higher import prices. Finally, real asset purchases raise private 
sector wealth, thereby encouraging consumption and investment. 
The main disadvantage of the first two strong options is that they require coordination with 
other government entities. In particular, foreign exchange intervention requires at least 
passive acquiescence by Japan’s trading partners, especially the United States, not 
necessarily easy to obtain. Real asset purchases do not require coordination, but they have 
significant consequences for income distribution, asset allocation and politics, which makes 
them difficult to adopt without some broader consensus being achieved. 
From this classification, it is clear that the BOJ chose only weak options, and perhaps the 
key question is: why was this the case? (Technically, the BOJ did buy small amounts of 
equities and private debt, but these operations were explicitly divorced from monetary 
policy.)  
Prof Ito suggests that the choice of only weak policies, and the slow pace of doing even that, 
partly reflected a bias against inflation. There certainly is evidence to support such a 
conclusion, which he cites, including the BOJ’s reluctance and tardiness in adopting 
unconventional measures, its frequently voiced concerns that low interest rates retard the 
restructuring process and distort asset allocation, and various comments about “good 
deflation”. Prof Ito suggests that the independence acquired by the BOJ following the 
adoption of the new Bank of Japan Law in 1998 creates a bias towards hawkishness as a 
way to display that independence, and this seems quite possible. 
The second issue is that of accountability. The BOJ evidently did not perceive itself as having 
a strong mandate to “own” the problem of deflation, that is, to firmly commit to taking 
necessary steps to achieve positive inflation in a timely way. Instead, it tended to react 
tactically and reluctantly. Prof Ito suggests that this problem could be cured by the BOJ 
having an explicit inflation target. However, it is not clear that the BOJ could achieve an 
inflation target using only weak unconventional policies. Ultimately, this is probably the main 
reason why the BOJ strongly resisted adopting an inflation target. 
As mentioned above, the first two strong policy options require some sort of policy 
coordination. The Japanese government clearly has not wanted to expand fiscal policy, given 
its worries about the high government debt level. However, if the BOJ can monetise the debt, 
then it is not obvious that this concern is rational. Regarding currency intervention, the BOJ 
cited the legal primacy of the Ministry of Finance in setting foreign exchange policy, but 
comments by the Ministry did not suggest it was opposed to activity by the BOJ in this area. 
However, one can imagine that the US government would not have been too enthusiastic 
about this. To be sure, it did acquiesce when the Ministry bought a total of JPY 35 trillion of 
dollars between January 2003 and March 2004. However, this intervention was aimed mainly 
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recycle the current account surplus, and the intervention stopped when normal private capital 
outflows resumed. This is somewhat different from an attempt to substantially devalue the 
yen. 
Regarding asset purchases, the BOJ seems to have regarded these as possible, but only to 
be used in the case of a deflationary spiral. However, in the absence of policy coordination, 
the implication of strong accountability is that the BOJ should be prepared to adopt such 
policies if needed to fulfil its mandate. Therefore, the extent of the BOJ’s mandate remains 
unclear, and a shift to an inflation target could clarify this. 
II.  Quantitative easing - impact and exit conditions 
Much of the paper is devoted to issues concerned with the timing and method of the ending 
of quantitative easing. Prof Ito is generally critical that the BOJ may have exited too soon. 
However, all of this discussion begs the more fundamental question of whether or not 
quantitative easing had a significant impact. If not, then this debate is beside the point. The 
paper would benefit from a more thorough discussion of this issue. 
Professor Ito suggests that quantitative easing may have had some impact, but I believe the 
evidence for this is pretty scant. The basic theoretical reason for scepticism is the widely 
cited point that, under zero interest rates, short-term paper is equivalent to cash. Therefore, 
operations to increase the level of current accounts at the Bank of Japan simply involve 
swapping different cash equivalents, with no impact on the liquidity of banks’ balance sheets. 
Ito cites one study (Oda and Ueda (2005)) that found only modest evidence of an effect of 
the level of excess reserves on short-term interest rates, and they speculated that even this 
impact could be transitory. Former Bank of Japan Deputy Governor Yutaka Yamaguchi, who 
was one of those who initially voted to adopt quantitative easing, later expressed his view 
that quantitative easing had little or no impact. There is no evidence of a portfolio rebalancing 
effect toward risky assets, or of impacts on credit growth or inflation expectations. It is widely 
acknowledged that the injection of high levels of liquidity reduced the perception of financial 
sector risk, but it is difficult to claim much beyond this. Although the economy ultimately did 
recover, this appears to have been due to a recovery of exports and progress of other 
structural adjustments. Therefore, it seems that the BOJ was mainly lucky in terms of timing 
in adopting quantitative easing.  
III.  Recommendations for the post-QE policy framework 
If quantitative easing did not work, then the BOJ has misallocated scarce resources by going 
to great lengths to specify the criteria for ending quantitative easing, but saying 
comparatively little about the conditions for ending the ZIRP, which is almost certainly a more 
important issue. Prof Ito notes that the BOJ’s “understanding” of price stability of 0-2% for the 
CPI in its new policy framework could eventually evolve into a full-fledged inflation targeting 
framework, and this makes a lot of sense as a communication device. It also would tend to 
curb the bias of the BOJ against inflation. However, the BOJ shows little inclination at this 
stage to go beyond the present framework. 
IV. Conclusions 
One has to agree with Prof Ito’s conclusion that the BOJ’s policy during the period after 1998 
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in 2000 was the biggest error, and was pretty clearly a mistake ex ante as well as ex post, 
given that the economy was still experiencing deflation at the time, and that there was 
uncertainty about the outlook. The communication of the BOJ’s policy goals and criteria also 
could have been better. In contrast, the BOJ seemed to rush too fast to exit from quantitative 
easing and the ZIRP. The big question is why the BOJ only adopted “weak” policy options 
unlikely to be very effective in a liquidity trap environment. It clearly did not regard itself as 
“accountable” for maintaining price stability in any strong sense. Adoption of inflation 
targeting could help to remedy these shortcomings. 
Despite all the debate about the timing and method of quantitative easing, it is difficult, and 
perhaps beside the point, to evaluate these arguments in the absence of an overall 
assessment of the effect of this policy. This aspect needs to be explored more fully. The 
evidence in my opinion does not support the view that quantitative easing had a significant 
impact, and therefore the ending of quantitative easing is not likely to have much impact 
either. 
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